On May 1, Masaki Saito, the Office Chief of Japan's Interchange Association in Taipei made a public statement in Taiwan saying "Taiwan's status is undetermined." Although this statement caused protests from authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the "strong dissatisfaction" was nevertheless to a large extent submerged by the "strong low-keyed responses.”

Concerning the source of "Taiwan's status is undetermined," there have been many discussions by the media. I do not intend to say more than what is necessary. What I only wish to emphasize and proclaim is the passiveness and helplessness of the authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

In 1943 during the Anti-Japanese War, in order to encourage the Chinese Nationalist Government to fight and thus alleviate the pressure on the battlefield in Asia, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union reached the Cairo Declaration consensus with Chiang Kai-shek, which contains the provision that after Japan's defeat Taiwan and Penghu would be returned to China.  The Korean War broke out in 1951. In order to send the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. cooked up the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1952 Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (Here "Sino" refers to the Republic of China). The two treaties only mention Japan giving up Taiwan and Penghu without specifying their attribution.  By doing so, the U.S. was, first, to create a legal cover up for intervening in the internal affairs of other countries and, second, to pave the way to split China in the future. Since then, the so-called "Taiwan's status is undetermined" emerged. And at the same time, it also provided a major theoretical basis for the growing Taiwan independence movement.

Even if the motives of the United States and Japan were abominable, not many people noticed that Article 4 of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty clearly stipulates that all the Sino-Japanese treaties prior to December 9, 1941, are void. Since the Treaty of Shimonoseki which ceded Taiwan to Japan was nullified, this means that Taiwan should naturally be returned to its original owner and should restore its innate status as China's territory.

In the early 70s, out of strategic need the United States reached out for China and published by February 1972 the Shanghai Communiqué, in which the U.S. declared: “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." According to this statement, even if the international recognition of which government representing the Chinese central government may still have different opinions, the question of Taiwan should be vested in China has fully been clarified. In particular, Japan in the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement of September 1972 even more specifically expressed that the Japanese Government “fully understands and respects the stance of the Chinese Government on the Taiwan question, which is that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China.”

Now, with such a clear political and legal backdrop, Masaki Saito, as Japan’s government representative stationed in the Republic of China, suddenly raised the "has yet to be decided" issue, clearly designed to stir up controversy on the island and even intended to undermine the peace process between the two sides. Regardless of whether the initiatives was inspired by the United States or not, as far as the status and situation of Japan is concerned, such an offensive meddling in China’s internal affairs would always leave people an impression of substantive absurdity:

1. According to international laws, under Articles 53, 77, and 137 of the United Nations Charter (U.N. Charter), Japan is still an "enemy state.” In other words, the Charter’s provisions of prohibiting the use of force against an “enemy state” are entirely inapplicable. As we all know, the acceptance of Japanese surrender by the victors of the war was conditioned on the implementation of the Potsdam Proclamation and the Cairo Declaration, namely, it is necessary to recognize China's territorial sovereignty over Taiwan. If Japan continues to challenge this fact, this means it did not satisfactorily meet the conditions of surrender, and therefore it also retains the status of an "enemy state.” In view of this, there is entirely no need for the Chinese authorities to obtain authorization of the Security Council; simply by invoking the U.N. Charter’s "enemy state" clauses, they can reasonably, lawfully and at any time carry out military sanctions on Japan. Japan's birth defects in this regard should be made clear to Japan by the authorities of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and if necessary, even use as a threat the statement "forever refuse Japan to participate in the Security Council, never amend the corresponding provisions of the Charter”.

2. According to a series of international requirements at the end of the Second World War, the territory of the defeated Japan was limited to the four home islands, and the land returned to Japan with the consent of the victors. The so-called four home islands (Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu, and Shikoku) naturally do not include the Northern Territory under dispute with Russia, the Dokdo Island under dispute with South Korea, as well as the Diaoyu Islands under dispute with China. As for the Liu Qiu Islands (Ryukyu Islands) that were returned to Japan by the United States in 1972, the U.S. then as the  mandatory power of this trusteeship should initially follow Article 76, paragraph b, of the U.N. Charter to carry out an independent investigation on the will of self-governance and independence of the Liu Qiu people. The U.S. should then make decisions that were consistent with the people’s well-being. In fact, the United States as the mandatory power did not solicit the views of the Liu Qiu people prior to returning this region to Japan. So legally there is still room for challenging the legitimacy of these decisions. Even if the Beijing government had been concerned with strategic considerations of the 70s and supported the incorporation of the Liu Qiu Islands into Japan, however, as long as Japan was hostile on the Taiwan issue, the authorities on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait could quite possibly seek cooperation with Russia and South Korea and North Korea. Using the reason of "uncertain status of the Liu Qiu Islands" the two sides can establish a strong case. Concerning the Diaoyu Islands, the two sides as authorities of the victors can also clearly point out in full accordance with the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China. At the same time, in order to match with this political advocacy, warships should be sent as early as possible to patrol the waters of the Diaoyu Islands, and eventually pressure the Japanese patrol ships to stay in the waters outside this region.

In conclusion, Japan's position according to international laws is rather weak and its own ethnic issues are more sensitive and vulnerable than China’s. However, if the authorities on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait take things lightly, then they will lose the power of diplomatic discourse and initiative, and even a defeated country can make irresponsible remarks on China's territorial sovereignty.