11/01/2019 No. 147
 
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Unification of Taiwan: Chinese Americans' Challenge
By Tze-Chung Li
January 1, 2008


Taiwan is an integral part of China.  Taiwan and China separated as a result of civil war in 1949, and since then have been governed separately. They are two political entities in China, but not two Chinas.

 

Taiwan status de jure

 

By Article 2 of the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, the island of Formosa (Taiwan), together with all islands appertaining or belonging to Formosa and the Pescadores Group, were ceded by China to Japan.1   The Cairo Declaration of 1943 explicitly states that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to China.2   In the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as the United States, Great Britain, and China determine.3   The Potsdam Declaration was accepted in Japan's surrender instrument on September 2, 1945.4   On October 25, Japanese Governor-General Rikichi Ando transferred administration to General Chen Yi of China.  Taiwan was formally and legally returned to China.

 

The Treaty of Peace with Japan of 1951 provides in Article 2(b) that "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores."5   Though it doesn't state that these territories be specifically returned to China, the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan of 1952 clarifies the return of Taiwan to China.6   Article IV of the Treaty provides "all treaties, conventions and agreements concluded before December 9, 1941, between China and Japan have become null and void as a consequence of the war." Taiwan was ceded to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki noted above. As stipulated in the Peace Treaty, the Treaty of Shimonoseki became null and void.  Accordingly, Taiwan's return to China is a matter of course.

 

The Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China of 1972, known as the Shanghai Communique, stipulates the "one-China principle" and "Taiwan is a part of China." 7   President Nixon gave private assurances on February 22, 1972, to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai on Taiwan.  He said:  "there is only one China, and Taiwan is a part of China. ... We have not and will not support any Taiwan independence movement. . . . we will support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue that can be worked out.  And related to that point, we will not support any military attempts by the Government on Taiwan to resort to military return to the mainland."8

 

The Shanghai Communique was reaffirmed in the 1979 Communique:  "[t]he Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." 9   The 1982 Communique further elaborates "[t]he United States Government attaches great importance to its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no intention of . . . pursuing a policy of 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan.'  The United States Government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. "10

 

Former Secretary of State Colin L. Powell stated in 2004 that "our [U.S.]policy is clear. There is only one China. Taiwan is not independent. It does not enjoy sovereignty as a nation, and that remains our policy, our firm policy. And it is a policy that has allowed Taiwan to develop a very vibrant democratic system, a market economic system and provided great benefits to the people of Taiwan. And that is why we think it is a policy that should be respected and should remain in force and will remain in force.  On the American side, it is our policy that clearly rests on Three Communiques. To repeat it one more time: we do not support an independence movement in Taiwan."11

 

Taiwan status de facto

 

Taiwan separates from China which has its own government, territory, and people, is in fact an independent entity.  Its independence is recognized by the United States in the Taiwan Relations Act.12   The Act deals with Taiwan as if it were an independent nation and the American Institute in Taiwan acts as if it were an embassy.  Taiwan's independent status is further affirmed by President Reagan's Six Assurances which provides in point 5 that "[t]he United States would not alter its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan which was, that the question was one to be decided peacefully by the Chinese themselves, and would not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China."13

 

It may be noted that the Taiwanese independence movement (MIT) began in earnest in the middle of 1940s after Taiwan was returned to China.  Thomas Liao formed the Formosan League for Re-emancipation and Hsieh Hsueh-hung created the Taiwan Democratic Self-government League. 14    In 1970, the Taiwan independence movement organizations in Japan, Europe, Canada, and USA joined forces under the name of World United Formosans for Independence with headquarters in Taiwan. 15 The Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), Taiwan's main congressional lobbyist, established in 1982 in Los Angeles, is a world-wide, Washington-headquartered organization for an independent and democratic Taiwan. 16

 

The Taiwan government is pursuing legal independence, short of formal declaration, on the basis of national identity as Taiwan and the Taiwan center consciousness.  In August 2002, Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian declared "one country on each side of the Strait (yibian yiguo)."  In 2006, he terminated the National Unification Council, an office in the commitment of unification with China.17   The Taiwan government  plans to revise Taiwan textbooks dropping any reference that recognizes Chinese historical figures, places and artifacts as "national [guo]."  Some 5,000 alleged "inappropriate" references to "China [zhong guo]" will be revised in Taiwanese textbooks.   "National opera," "the Ming Dynasty,"  and "this nation's historical figures" will be changed to "Chinese opera," "China's Ming Dynasty," and  "China's historical figures," respectively.18   The textbook changes are in line with the current thinking of Chen Shui-bian's ruling Democratic Progressive Party, which wants Taiwanese independence and opposes unification with China.

 

On July 19, 2007, Taiwan applied to join the United Nations as Taiwan ‑‑ a departure from 14 previous post‑1971 applications as the Republic of China, a possibility of seeking independence for Taiwan and even changing the name of Taiwan. Its application was rejected on July 23. 19   In response, China may take a step further asking the UN to vote that Taiwan is part of China on the basis of UN Resolution 2758.20  The Taiwan government also plans to have referendums next year on independence and the United Nations membership, a move toward independence.   

 

In his recent interview with Edward Cody of The Washington Post, Chen Shui-bian stated that "Taiwan is an independent nation."  Negotiation with China must be based on four principles: sovereignty, democracy, peace, and parity, said he.  His definition of  "sovereignty" is respect for and acceptance of the reality and the status quo of Taiwan's being an independent, sovereign country. Taiwan must not be belittled, marginalized, or treated as a local entity, nor may attempts be made to delegitimize Taiwan government or refuse to recognize that this government wields public authority, said Chen. 21

 

The Taiwan government's bold drive for independence may base on its calculated risk that China is now unable to take over Taiwan by force, and if China can, the United States may rush in to its defense.   The risk makes the situation in the Taiwan Strait explosive everyday.

 

United States positions on unification

 

Unification of Taiwan is a domestic issue and should be decided by Taiwan and China themselves. Since the United States is involved, unification becomes complicated and extremely difficult to achieve.  Four positions on the Taiwan issue may be mentioned.

1. The official position. The United States official position is constructive ambiguity.  It is constructive that the United States abides by the three Communiques and supports one China and Taiwan a part of China.  It is ambiguous in that the United States continues sales of military equipment to Taiwan to make Taiwan capable of defending against China's attack, insists to maintain the status quo to exercise restraints on both Taiwan and China to avoid war, and makes it uncertain military involvement in defending Taiwan.  Though clarity of ambiguity had been made in favor of China or Taiwan in the past from President Clinton's three noes 22  to President Bush's explicit statement of defending Taiwan, 23  the U.S. strategy  remains ambiguous.   The ambiguous strategy is considered safer, smarter, as well as more realistic.  It allows the United States if, when, and how might protect Taiwan.24

 

The United States opposes any move contrary to the status quo.  Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick summarized the U.S. position on Taiwan in six points.  The United States should (1) maintain "one China policy"; (2) abide by three Communiques and Taiwan Relations Act; (3) assist Taiwan's accession to APEC and WTO as an economy; (4) make defensive articles available to Taiwan; (5) insist no unilateral change in the status quo by either side of the Taiwan Strait; and (6) support direct dialogue, including with elected leaders of Taiwan. 25   In responding to Rep. Diane Watson's complaints about how Taiwan's president was treated during his visit to Latin America, he said "we want to be supportive of Taiwan, while we're not encouraging those that try to move toward independence. Because let me be very clear: independence means war." 26  

 

The United States clearly rejects independence for Taiwan and even change of the name of Taiwan.27   Deputy Secretary Richard L. Armitage considered that the Taiwan Relations Act requires the United States to keep sufficient force in the Pacific to be able to deter attack, but the United States has no obligation to defend Taiwan. 28   On the Taiwan government's attempt to change their official name of ROC to Taiwan, Adam Ereli, State Department Deputy Spokesman said: "there are reports of a number of sort of impending name changes. . . frankly, we're not supportive of them. As you know, the United States has an interest in maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait. That's what we want to see, and we are therefore opposed to any unilateral steps that would change the status quo."29

 

After the Hu-Bush meeting on April 20, 2006, President Bush remarked at the Oval Office regarding Taiwan: "We spent time talking about Taiwan, and I assured the President my position has not changed. I do not support independence for Taiwan."

 

2. The position to defend Taiwan.  Others hold the view that the United States must defend Taiwan because American interest is at stake.  Pointed out in the Annual Report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission to Congress, China's economic integration with its neighbors in East Asia raises the prospects of an Asian economic area dominated or significantly influenced by China. The U.S. has an interest in China's integration in Asia if it gives all parties a stake in avoiding hostilities. Nonetheless, U.S. influence in the area could wane to a degree. 30   To defend Taiwan, the Commission recommends that the Department of Defense continues its substantive military dialogue with Taiwan and conducts exchanges on issues ranging from threat analysis, doctrine, and force planning. 31    

 

In contrast to Armitage's position noted above, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Randall G. Schriver who claims himself as pro-Taiwan, but not anti-China said: "[t]he Taiwan Relations Act not only talks about providing weapons for sufficient self-defense. . . we have an obligation to maintain the capacity to resist force if asked to do so. . . That's not a defense treaty, but there are some very important obligations there."32

 

According to U.S.-Taiwan defense doctrine, the Taiwanese military would have to fight an invasion alone for at least four days until American naval forces arrive. But China could also go with a so-called decapitation strategy -- coordinated commando attacks and pinpoint bombing of the island's leaders and key institutions to paralyze the island before American reinforcements can arrive. 33

 

The United States is concerned with the loss of influence in the Far East, if Taiwan is unified with China.  An Independent Task Force on U.S.-China relations, established by the Council on Foreign Relations, reports that one drive for Chinese military modernization is to have the ability to fight and win a war in Taiwan in the absence of U.S. intervention and recommends that the U.S. make its stance on Taiwan more explicit, that is the United States does not rule out using force to deter Chinese attempt to compel unification through force. 34

 

A RAND report points out that the most likely conflict between the United States and China would be over Taiwan. 35   China could potentially defeat the United States in a future military conflict over Taiwan by using "antiaccess" strategies designed to limit U.S. military access to the combat zone.  The net result of these strategies is that China could actually defeat the United States in a conflict -- not in the traditional sense of destroying the U.S. military, but in the sense of China accomplishing its military and political objectives while preventing America from achieving some or all of its objectives.    Another RAND report outlines three key security challenges to the United States, its interests, and its allies: terrorist and insurgent groups; regional powers with nuclear weapons; and increasing security competition in Asia, which could result in a military confrontation with China over Taiwan.  RAND suggests measures to overcome modern anti-access weapons and methods, particularly theater ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.36

 

Jed Babbin and Edward Timperlake consider China's military growth poses a threat to American security. 37   There is possible certainty of war with China. With respect to Taiwan, they state: "President Bush and his successors must take a   'tough force' approach with the Taiwanese. If the Taiwanese are unwilling to spend the necessary money to defend themselves they should be told in unmistakable terms that we will not spend blood and treasure in their defense. The Taiwanese need a big dose of reality."38

 

The Hudson Institute reports China's rising high technology and military power pose a challenge to the United States.   In China-Taiwan conflict, China may  (1) seize the initiative early by forcing an adversary to react to China's move; (2) pursue limited strategic aims, by winning and securing Taiwan with a fait accompli to avoid harming any of the United States main interest; (3) strike five "key points", namely command systems, information system, weapon systems, logistics systems, and the linkage among these; and (4) avoid direct confrontation, by defeating a handful of critical defenses; and (5) utilize high technology war and prepare against the military intervention. It is a seven-day war (blitzkrieg operation) to occupy Taiwan.  The U.S. must be prepared to fight the twenty-first century version of war. 39

 

At his confirmation hearing before the Senate armed services committee on March 8. U.S. Navy Adm. Timothy Keating warned that as China increases its military spending, the United States needs to keep a watchful eye over Taiwan. The admiral emphasized that the United States should be prepared to step in to protect Taiwan should the need occur, even though some members of Congress have warned that Taiwan has sometimes gone out of its way to provoke a hostile confrontation with China in an attempt to declare independence from the Communist state. 40  Adm. Keating also said on April 15 in Guam that tensions over Taiwan are a factor in the military buildup of Guam but the U.S. was working with China and Taiwan to avert any conflict over the island.41

 

In a report to Congress on China's military power, the Department of Defense points out China is now building capacity for conventional precision strike. China has strengthened position relative to Taiwan by increasing the mainland's economic leverage over Taiwan, fostering Taiwan's diplomatic isolation, and shifting the cross-Strait military balance in the mainland's favor. But the U.S. Department of Defense, through the transformation of U.S. Armed Forces and global force posture realignments, is maintaining the capacity to resist any effort by China to resort to force to dictate the terms of Taiwan's future status. 42

 

The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Institute for International Economics consider that military conflict between China and Taiwan is not inevitable. When it were to occur, however, it would very likely lead to serious political, and potentially military, conflict between the United States and China. U.S. policy toward the Taiwan impasse has been primarily concerned with process; the United States urges that any resolution be peaceful and non-coercive (thus pursuing a declared policy of "peaceful resolution" rather than China's "peaceful reunification"). Washington also has declared its opposition to unilateral actions by either side to change the status quo. But, the ball of unifying China is in China's hand to display more creativity in its approach to Taiwan to truly win the hearts and minds of the island's people in order to ensure the peaceful achievement of unification.43

 

3. The hands-off position.  James McGregor considers that U.S. and China have manageable differences and complimentary interests. The United States could help China and itself at the same time. He suggests that domestic politics should stop at the U.S. border and stop preaching instant democracy. 44

           

The issue of Taiwan could lead to a disastrous war between the United States and China, says Ted Galen Carpenter.  The United States, China, and Taiwan are on a collision course, and unless something dramatically changes, an armed conflict is virtually inevitable within a decade. Carpenter explains what the United States must do quickly to avoid being dragged into war. The United States should make it clear and firm that the United States will not become involved in any armed struggle between Taiwan and China if a conflict between Taiwan and China occurs.45

           

Taiwan and China themselves should solve their problem peacefully. Richard C. Bush cautions the danger that both sides consider that time favors its adversary.  Some in Taiwan conclude that the only way to secure the future is to go for independence while China is relatively weak and constrained by the Olympics, whereas to China, preemptive military action is needed to keep the door to unification from closing. The danger is to invite unnecessary conflict. Both sides should take option of shaping the current situation to maximize their shared interests and minimize the risk of a foolish conflict. 46

 

4. The pro-independence position.  Lawrence B. Wilkerson, the U.S. Army Colonel who was Collin Powell's chief of staff through two administrations, points out that "neocons" at the top of the administration quietly encouraged Taiwanese politicians to move toward a declaration of independence from mainland China.  They included such key architects of the Iraq War as Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy defense secretary, Douglas Feith, the undersecretary for policy, and Steven Cambone, Rumsfeld's intelligence chief, and President Bush's controversial envoy to the United Nations, John Bolton. The Defense Department was dispatching a person to Taiwan every week, essentially to tell the Taiwanese that the alliance was back on. 47    In his recent visit to Taiwan in August, Bolton voiced support for Taiwan's representation in the United Nations.48

 

Reports James Fallows, former senator Gary Hart, who served as co-chair of the U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, the Hart-Rudman Commission, mentioned Mrs. Lynne Cheney on the commission opined that the overwhelming threat was from China. Sooner or later the U.S. would end up in a military showdown with the Chinese Communists. There was no avoiding it, and we would only make ourselves weaker by waiting. No one else spoke up in support. The same argument happened at the second meeting. Finally, in frustration, she left the commission.  Hart added. "I am convinced that if it had not been for 9/11, we would be in a military showdown with China today." Not because of what China was doing, threatening, or intending, he made clear, but because of the assumptions the Administration brought with it when taking office .49

 

Another key character in the hawkish group was Therese Shaheen, wife of Rumsfield's spokesman, DiRita, the former chief of the U.S. office of the American Institute in Taiwan.  She openly championed the independence movement, at one point even publicly reinterpreting President Bush's reiteration of the "one China" policy, saying that the administration "had never said it opposed Taiwan independence."  Colin Powell asked for her resignation. 50

 

On February 16, 2007, Representative Thomas G. Tancredo  introduced Bipartisan Resolution that would call for the United States to resume normal diplomatic relations with Taiwan.51   U.S. lawmakers introduced a resolution on June 26, 2007, for an end to restrictions on visits to the United States by high-level Taiwanese officials.  The resolution was unanimously adopted by a voice vote on July 30, 2007.  A parallel resolution is in the works in the Senate.  The resolution's sponsor in the House, Republican Steve Chabot, says it is time to send a clear message to Beijing over Taiwan, which the United States is legally bound to defend in any military conflict.52   Rep. Steve Chabot is a strong supporter of Taiwan. In his letter to Examiner a year ago, Rep. Chabot considers that "there is a lot more at stake for the U.S. than who controls power in Taipei. Should Taiwan decide to move in the direction of accommodation with the PRC, U.S. interests in Asia would steadily be eroded.53

 

Bruce Herschensohn, another staunch supporter of Taiwan, states that the first Shanghai Communique was intentionally misinterpreted as a basis for the other two Communiques.54   He produced President Nixon's letter to President Carter, in which President Nixon expressed concern about President Carter's recognition of China with no adequate guarantees against the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue. 55   The letter appears to be contrary to the declassified President Nixon's assurance noted earlier.  Herschensohn urges the United States to defend Taiwan as a democratic nation.

Chinese Americans Challenge

 

The U. S. official position insists on the status quo and peaceful resolution on unification and remains ambiguous in defending Taiwan. The U.S. Congress is incredibly supportive of Taiwan.   Congressional support takes a number of bipartisan initiatives to focus more U.S. attention on Taiwan and to raise its international status which include House establishment of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus in 2002, Senate establishment of the Senate Taiwan Caucus in 2003, 56   and fairly recently House resolution to lift restrictions on Taiwan high officials visit to the United States, noted earlier.  While opposing Taiwan's move for independence, Senator Dianne Feinstein gave scary remarks: there is a "mind-set in Congress" and "China is destined to become an enemy of the U.S." 57    

 

American public, however, tends to support one China and Taiwan a part of China. In 2003, the Foreign Policy Association released its National Opinion Ballot Report which highlights its findings on Taiwan: (1) 26 percent yes and 74 percent no to the question, should the U.S. make an explicit pledge to defend Taiwan against an invasion from the mainland; (2) 35 percent yes and 65 percent no to the question, should the U.S. encourage Taiwan's quest for independence.58 But, public opinion is volatile. To unify Taiwan with China may be achieved by force at a risk of possible conflict with the United States.  The result will be devastating in a heavy loss of human lives and properties. To pursue peaceful unification, though not an up-hill fight, has roadblocks in the way. 

 

Chinese in the United States who believe in a strong, unified, prosperous China is to their interest and pride, are supporting and upholding with passion and tenacity the one-China principle.  They have formed organizations to advocate, advance, and promote unification of Taiwan, such as Hetonghui (Peaceful Unification of China Association), Cutonghui (Advocating Unification Association), One China Committee, China-U.S. Friendship Exchange, Inc., New York Association for Peaceful Unification of China, Taiwan Alliance for One China Action, and others.  Both Hetonghui and Cutonghui have a number of chapters in the States, with slightly different names.  Hetonghui will hold its Global Summit for China's Peaceful Unification in Washington, D.C., on November 16-18, 2007.   The New York Association and the Taiwan Alliance are organized by Chinese Americans born in Taiwan.  The One China Committee was formed by a group of Americans and Americans of Chinese descent.59 The China-U.S. Friendship Exchange, Inc. concentrates on interactions with the mainstream American society via bilingual website and English-language book publications.

 

Their mission and efforts are in unison. It is their challenge to campaign vigorously to the American public and private sectors on one China and Taiwan is part of China.  Efforts are to (1) inform and update members of Congress on unification of Taiwan; (2) try to change the mind-set of Congress in favor of unification; (3) provide the media, scholars and the general public with information on the cause of unification; (4) start a grassroots campaign for one China; (5) suggest the United States to diminish or abandon involvement in Taiwan; and (6) reiterate no legal obligation of the United States to defend Taiwan.  

 

NOTES

 

1. Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed at Shimonoseki 17 April 1895; entered into Force 8 May 1895. Article 2 of the treaty provides that "China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon:. . .(b) The island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa [and] (c) The Pescadores Group. . "

2. Cairo Conference, attended by President Gen. Chiang Kai-shek, President Franklin Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 22 - 26 November 1943; text released December 1, 1943

3. Potsdam Declaration, July 26, 1945, issued by U.S. President Harry Truman, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

4. Instrument of Surrender, signed at Tokyo Bay, Japan, September 2, 1945.

5. Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco, September 8, 1951

6. Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan,  signed at Taipei, April 28, 1952;
entered into force, 5 August 1952.

7. February 28, 1972.  The Communique provides "The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of  'one China, one Taiwan,' 'one China, two governments,' 'two Chinas', and 'independent Taiwan' or advocate that the status of Taiwan remains to be determine. . .  The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves."

8.  Recently declassified records, see http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/DOC_readers/kissinger/nixzhou/12‑05.htm    

9. Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America, January 1, 1979.

10. Joint Communique between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America, August 17, 1982.

11. In an interview with Anthony Yuen of Phoenix TV China World Hotel, Beijing, China, on October 25, 2004. Later, he clarified his October 25th statement saying the goal "really is to have a peaceful resolution of the problem" between Taiwan and China, which split amid civil war in 1949."  In a TV interview October 27 with U.S. television channel CNBC.

12. Taiwan Relations Act, April 10, 1979. 

13.  Six Assurances of July 1982.

14. Stephen Phillips, "Building a Taiwanese Republic: The Independence Movement, 1945-Present," in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ed., Dangerous Trait: The U.S.-Taiwan- China Crisis (Columbia University Pr., 2005), pp. 48-9.

15. www.wufi.org.tw.

16. www.fapa.org.

17..  Guidelines for National Unification, adopted by the Council on February 23, 1991 and by the Executive Yuan at its 2223rd Council meeting on March 14, 1991.

18. Sina.com,  Jul 22, 2007; Annie Huangm, Washington Post, Jul 23, 2007/

19. International Herald Tribune, Jul 23, 2007.The United Nations rejected Taiwan's application to become a member of the world body, citing a 1971 resolution that switched recognition from Taipei to Beijing as China's sole lawful representative to the world body. Taiwan's government held the U.N. seat until 1971.

20. The Resolution, adopted at the 1967th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on October 25, 1971, reads in part "[d]ecides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwirh the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Stations and in all the organizations related to it."

21. Interview conducted on July 6 by Edward Cody of The Washington Post Foreign Service, Washington Post, July 8, 2007.

22. Three noes policy by Clinton: (1) no support for an independent Taiwan; (2) no recognition of "two Chinas" or one China and a separate Taiwan; and (3) no support for Taiwan's admission to any international organization that requires statehood as a condition for membership

23. President Bush stated on the ABC Good Morning America April 25, 2001 that the United States would do whatever it takes to help Taiwan to defend itself. In April 2001, the President also approved a substantial sale of U.S. weapons to Taiwan, including Kidd-class destroyers, anti-submarine P-3 "Orion" aircraft, and diesel submarines. The White House also was more accommodating to visits from Taiwan officials than previous U.S. Administrations

24. In his presentation on U.S.-China relations before the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives on May 10, 2006.

25. Ibid.

26. Three noes policy by Clinton: (1) no support for Taiwan independence; (2) no recognition of "two Chinas" or one China and a separate Taiwan; and (3) no support for Taiwan's admission to any international organization that requires statehood as a condition for membership

27. President Bush stated on the ABC Good Morning America April 25, 2001, that the United States would do whatever it takes to help Taiwan to defend itself. In April 2001, the President also approved a substantial sale of U.S. weapons to Taiwan, including Kidd-class destroyers, anti-submarine P-3 "Orion" aircraft, and diesel submarines. The White House also was more accommodating to visits from Taiwan officials than previous U.S. Administrations.

28. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity?" in Tucker, ed. Dangerous Strait: The U.S. -Taiwan-China Crisis (Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 205-210.

29. In his presentation on U.S.-China relations before the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives on May 10, 2006.

30. Ibid.

31. Testimony in Congress on February 7, 2004.

32. Peter Enav, San Francisco Chronicle, August 12, 2006.

33. Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, a Responsible Course (2007), pp. 47-54, 86-87.

34. Released on March 29, 2007.

35. A New Division of Labor: Meeting America's Security Challenges Beyond Iraq, prepared by RAND Project AIR FORCE, the U.S. Air Force's federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses.

36.  Showdown: Why China Wants War With the United States (Regnery, 2006), an essay and a fiction, presenting hawkish and provocative view on China's fast growing military strength.

37. Ibid., p. 150.

38. China's New Great Leap Forward: High Technology and Military Power in the Next Half-Century (2005).

39. Shihoko Goto, United Press International, Mach 10, 2007

40. Audrey Mcavoy, Terrorism Research Center, Apr 16, 2007

41. U.S. Department of Defense released May 25 a report to Congress on China's military power pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2000.  Precision capacity includes Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs), Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) (1000-3000 km), Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs), Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASMs), and Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs).

42. Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Institute for International Economics, China: The Balance Sheet (Public Affairs, 2006).

43. James McGregor, "Advantage, China. In This Match, They Play Us Better Than We Play Them," Washington Post, July 31, 2005.

44. Ted Galen Carpenter, America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan  (Palgrave Macmillan , 2006). Dr. Carpenter is Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute.

45. Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. (Brookings Institution Press, 2005). Mr. Bush is former chairman and managing director of the American Institute in Taiwan, based in Washington, D.C.

46. Reported by Jeff Stein, CQ, June 1, 2007.

47. Hart's conversation with James Fallows in an article, The AtlanticOnline, July 5, 2007.   The Philippine LaRouche Society gave the article an alarming title: "The Cheney Gang Planned War on China."

48. Note 45,

49. H. Cong Res 73.

50. Yahoo!News, June 26, 2007. The resolution was passed unanimously by a voice vote on July 30, 2007.  A similar resolution which was introduced by Rep. Chabot in 2004 and again in 2006 went nowhere. Washington Post, August 1, 2007. 

51. Letter to Examiner, June 30, 2006.

52. Bruce Herschensohn, Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy (World Aheard, 2006), p. 26.

53. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

54.  In an update report in March 2006, "Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices," by Kerry B. Dumbaugh.

55. In a question-and-answer session, Feinstein said after her speech at the annual meeting of the Committee 100 in San Francisco on April 21, 2006. Reported David Armstrong, San Francisco Chronicle, April 21, 2006

56. Foreign Policy Association 2003 annual Great Decisions which includes the National Opinion Ballot Report. The national opinion ballot survey has conducted since 1955.
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Tze-Chung Li is Professor and Dean Emeritus, Dominican University and President, One China Committee. This article was prepared for the 6th Conference of the International Society for the Study of Overseas Chinese on September 20-23, 2007 at Beijing University.
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